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Social Vision: Breaking a philosophical impasse? 
 




Sensitivity vs. experience 
 
Adams and Kveraga’s general hypothesis is that our visual system has evolved to 
extract the meaning of social visual cues that convey information about other people’s 
emotions and intentions. This swift visual understanding of social cues makes 
adaptive sense, they argue, since it prepares us for anticipating events and behaviours 
that are essential for oiling the wheels of our social life. 
 
 There is, however, an interesting tension in the findings that Adams and Kveraga 
review. Most of the evidence they collect shows top-down influences impacting 
functional integration of social cues at a very early stage of visual information 
processing, thus strengthening the idea of cognitive penetrability in social vision. Yet, 
the lower the level at which such top-down influences occur, the less relevant the 
evidence would seem to be for clarifying issues pertaining to the phenomenology of 
visual experience, since such low-level processing takes place outside conscious 
awareness.  
 
 We must thus distinguish two very different questions. The first is whether 
properties like being angry or being threatening are properties that the visual system is 
sensitive to. Most of the findings Adams and Kveraga (2015) review encourage an 
affirmative answer to this question. Especially interesting are the studies involving 
blindsight patients, whose response to emotional facial expressions presented in their 
unimpaired visual field was greatly speeded up when a stimulus consisting in a 
person’s body displaying the same emotion was also presented in their impaired area. 
Confirming the role of shared social affordances in social vision—due to the low-
level integration of visually dissimilar stimuli—these studies illustrate the existence 
of a feedforward integration mechanism that seems to process visual information 
about emotions even though the processing bypasses the primary visual cortex and 
hence conscious awareness. 
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 The second, and more philosophically interesting question, is whether we can 
visually experience properties like being angry or being threatening—as opposed to 
seeming to visually experience them as a result of a cognitive event such as a 
perceptual judgment. This latter distinction fuels one of the most fraught debates in 
the philosophy of perception today. According to “rich” views about the contents of 
visual experience, we can indeed visually experience high-level properties such as 
being threatening, being angry or being a pine tree. These properties, it is claimed, are 
part of the sensory phenomenology of visual experiences. By contrast, according to 
“thin” or “sparse” views, visual experience can only involve low-level features, such 
as colour, shape, texture or movement.  
 
 Philosophical arguments on both sides of the debate have failed to settle this issue. 
Some have taken this to imply that there is no fact of the matter as to whether we 
should favour rich over sparse views, and suggest, but do not explore, the possibility 
that vision science could help resolve this philosophical impasse (Logue thanks 
Ophelia Deroy for this suggestion in her (2013)). In what follows, I would like to 
discuss Adams and Kveraga’s work in social vision as a step in that direction. But 
first things first: the arguments.  
 
 Pretty much everyone agrees that we can visually experience low-level properties 
such as colour, shape, motion or size. Advocates of sparse views hold that these are 
the only properties we can visually experience. They do not deny that things can 
visually seem to us as having high-level properties. They deny that these seemings 
have any phenomenology of their own (e.g. Tye, 1995) or, any sensory, as opposed to 
cognitive, phenomenology (e.g. Lyons, 2005). According to a widespread version of 
the sparse view, things visually seem to us as having high-level properties due to 
perceptual judgments occurring downstream of visual consciousness.  
 
 Probably the most detailed argument in favour of rich views is Siegel’s (2006, 
2010) phenomenal contrast argument. Siegel starts off with the plausible assumption 
that there is a phenomenological difference between the overall experiences one has 
before and after acquiring a recognition capacity such as the capacity to identify pine 
trees. Let’s call these overall experiences O1 and O2. If there is a phenomenological 
difference between O1 and O2, Siegel argues, then the most plausible explanation is 
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that the visual experiences, E1 and E2, which are parts of O1 and O2, differ in 
phenomenal character. She establishes this by discussing and eliminating two 
alternative explanations: that the altered phenomenology of O2 is due to the 
occurrence of cognitive state, e.g. a judgment, and that O1 and O2 differ in 
background phenomenology. She then argues that if E1 and E2 differ in phenomenal 
character, then the properties visually experienced while undergoing E1 and E2 are 
different. Since the low-level properties of the pine trees are the same in both E1 and 
E2, what you experience in E2, she concludes, is the property of being a pine tree. 
The same could be said for other high-level properties, like being a banana, being a 
table or being John Malkovich. Here, too, her argument is an argument to the best 
explanation, as she proceeds by discussing and rejecting two alternative accounts: 
there being some nonrepresentational feeling of familiarity in E2 and its representing 




Can Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model help to settle the debate between 
sparse and rich views? Let us focus on emotion. The model assumes two different 
pathways in the processing of visual emotional cues (Weisbuch & Adams 2012). The 
first prepares us to anticipate imminent physical danger and survival prospects in the 
environment through sensitivity to unattended emotional cues. When considering pre-
attentive responses to e.g. emotion expressions on members of a different racial group, 
some studies show that white and black participants exhibit a negative affect when 
they are subliminally exposed to the joy of the members of the other race (Weisbuch 
& Ambady, 2008). In general, evidence involving this pathway suggests that we are 
visually sensitive to very basic, evolutionarily relevant, albeit still high-level, 
properties such as being eatable or being dangerous. The sensitivity to these 
properties, and not low-level ones, is easily explained in evolutionary terms. Quickly 
detecting the presence of danger, or food, or a possible mate makes evolutionary 
sense in a way that detecting the presence of shapes and colours does not. Inasmuch 
as sparse views assume the visual system to be sensitive only to low-level properties, 
these results could be used to help decide against them. But the interesting issue about 
phenomenology would still remain unresolved by data involving this pathway.  
 
 4 
 The second pathway assumed by the functional forecast model involves conscious 
attention and triggers specific expectations about the likely behaviour of particular 
individuals based, it is claimed, on the visual perception of their emotion expressions. 
Studies about the influence of emotion in gender recognition show, for instance, that 
androgynous faces with angry expressions are more likely to be perceived as male, 
while faces with expressions of joy or fear tend to be perceived as female. They also 
show that when subjects are exposed to both male and female faces expressing joy, 
anger, sadness, fear or neutral faces, female faces expressing anger took the longest to 
be identified (Hess et al. 2009). The suggestion is that the visual experience of 
emotion is what helps (or disrupts, as in the second study) the gender categorization 
task. Yet, evidence coming from categorical identification tasks is, by its very nature, 
extremely ill-fitted for establishing anything about the underlying mechanisms, and 
hence to determine whether emotional properties are part of the contents of the visual 
experience itself or our seeming to experience them is the result of a post-perceptual 
event. 
 
 Could it not be that what seems like visual perception of emotional properties is 
instead the result of a perceptual judgment that subjects make based on their visually 
experiencing the low-level properties of the facial display? That both the pre-attentive 
and the attention driven response pathways are shown to be effortless, automatic and 
unintentional processing routes would seem to speak initially against this 
interpretation. Yet, even though, paradigmatically, judgments are taken to be 
conscious events deliberately formed based on evidence or as a result of reasoning, 
the idea of a perceptual judgment seems to be far from this paradigm. Perceptual 
judgments often occur without us realizing it. They also tend to be effortless, 
automatic and unintentional, and so are other post-perceptual processes that have 
nothing to do with vision, such as semantic priming.  
 
 Data about speed of visual information processing or selective activation in 
different brain regions also fail to deliver the right sort of evidence. The first kind 
tends to involve subliminal exposure to stimuli, which again may speak in favour of 
sensitivity, but not phenomenology. Moreover, even if the activation in the relevant 
brain areas were due to unique processing of visual information, it seems difficult to 
determine, in many of these experiments, whether the selective activation is a 
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response to emotional properties as such or low-level visual properties like the 
squareness of the jaw, the shape of the face or the roundness of the eyes.   
 
 The tie-breaker factor for distinguishing between visual and post-perceptual 
processes like perceptual judgments seems to be that what we visually experience has 
a kind of irresistibility that comes from mental processes being “strongly and directly 
controlled by specific and subtle features of the visual input itself” (Scholl & Gao, 
forthcoming, p. 9). The most relevant results would thus be those that show subjects 
being inescapably caught by the specifically emotional nuances of the visual stimuli, 
even when they know that they are really irrelevant or that they could distract them 
from their explicit task. When the task is gender recognition, that it takes subjects 
much longer to identify angry female faces is, for instance, what would be expected if 
anger was modulating attention exogenously as part of the subjects’ ongoing visual 
experience. This, together with the evolutionary and/or developmental salience of 
emotional properties found in the studies related to the non-attentional pathway, 
speaks in favour of there being this sort of irresistibility to the visual stimuli, which is 
the hallmark of visual processing. The data collected in support of Adams and 
Kveraga’s functional forecast model thus suggest that we have compelling reasons to 
think that we can visually experience high-level properties, although perhaps just of 
the kind that matters for meeting our biological and social needs—data remain silent 
about properties like being John Malkovich. In particular, the findings suggest that the 
distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving this sort of basic emotions 
and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to 
being brought about by perceptual judgments.  
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